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While algorithms bring about benefits for consumers in the form of more 
efficient price setting, they have also resulted in concerns about possible 
adverse effects, including discrimination. This Article takes a competition law 
perspective to analyze a type of discrimination that the use of algorithms may 
facilitate, namely personalized pricing. This is a form of price discrimination 
between consumers whereby a firm charges each consumer a different price 
depending on willingness to pay. As the advent of data analytics and 
algorithm-based services has made it easier for firms to engage in price 
discrimination, a clarification of the latter’s legality under competition law 
is welcome. As such, this Article discusses the extent to which competition 
enforcement can be desirable for targeting price discrimination towards end 
consumers. In this regard, the interaction with other regimes such as data 
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INTRODUCTION 
The gradual shift from human actors to computers in many aspects of everyday 
life is becoming more and more relevant to competition law. Computers, rather than 
human actors, are increasingly setting prices. Businesses such as airline tickets, hotel 
booking, and online retail commonly apply algorithms to determine what price best 
matches the demand and the offers of competitors. Because of the advent of big data 
analytics, algorithms can monitor prices more efficiently than human beings and are 
able to respond to market changes more quickly and accurately. In this context, 
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concerns have arisen about the ability of pricing algorithms to engage in collusion in 
the absence of any formal agreement or human interaction.2 In addition, providers of 
online platforms rely on algorithms to personalize their services to users. For 
instance, search engine providers use algorithms to select and rank the most relevant 
results in response to particular search queries. As algorithms become more 
prevalent, issues will further develop regarding their transparency and the extent to 
which they may give rise to discrimination. The central question of this Article is 
whether competition enforcement is desirable or required to address price 
discrimination as facilitated by the use of algorithms.  
Unlike other regimes, which generally deem discrimination undesirable,3 the 
competition regime typically considers this practice to have positive welfare effects 
from an economic perspective. Although discriminatory practices have been at stake 
in a number of competition cases, it is not entirely clear under what circumstances 
this conduct is abusive according to European Union (“EU”) competition law.4 
Meanwhile, the advent of data analytics and algorithm-based services has made it 
easier for firms to engage in discrimination. As a result, it is necessary to clarify the 
legal status of discrimination under competition law. Against this background, this 
Article focuses on discrimination towards end consumers in the form of personalized 
pricing whereby a firm charges different prices for the same product despite identical 
costs. 
This Article analyzes relevant decision-making practice and case law to identify 
the current principles applied to discrimination under the “abuse of dominance” 
regime of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”). In addition, this Article engages in a more normative analysis by 
exploring the possible role of competition law in combating discrimination next to 
other regimes such as internal market, data protection, and unfair trading law. While 
this Article raises issues that go well beyond the remit of algorithm-based services, 
the increasing use of algorithms conduces discrimination, which makes a 
clarification of the scope of competition enforcement in relation to this conduct all 
the more pressing. However, the aim of this Article is not to establish what the exact 
triggers for intervention should be but rather to provide a possible roadmap for 
critical questions concerning the desirability of competition enforcement to target 
discrimination. 
I. PRIMARY VERSUS SECONDARY LINE INJURY 
Before exploring price discrimination targeted at end consumers, it is worth 
looking at the competitive harm that may result from discrimination as it is currently 
understood. Competition economics distinguishes two types of injury that are 
relevant in assessing the competitive effects of discrimination: primary and 
secondary line injury.  
Primary line injury occurs where the supplier’s conduct produces effects 
against competitors in the market in which the supplier operates. By offering more 
favorable conditions to its own customers, for example in the form of selective price 
cuts or rebates, the supplier aims to prevent them from switching to rivals. In this 
                                                          
2 See A. EZRACHI & M.E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION. THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE 
ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 56-81 (Harv. Univ. Press 2016). 
3 Think for instance of human rights law and social law. 
4 See R. O’DONOGHUE & J. PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 245 (Hart 
Publishing 2013) (“Article 102(c) remains potentially very broad and gives rise to perhaps the greatest 
scope for potential confusion of any single clause under Article 102 TFEU.”). 
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scenario, the competitors of the supplier lose the business of the latter’s customers, 
who take advantage of the discriminatory conditions on offer. As such, the supplier’s 
objective is to foreclose rivals on the upstream market and thereby strengthen its own 
position in that market.5  
Secondary line injury concerns discrimination exercised by a supplier against 
some of its customers compared to one or more of its other customers. This way, the 
supplier may distort competition on the downstream market, where it is not active, 
by favoring some customers over others. As such, the impact falls on the supplier’s 
customers who compete with each other on the downstream market.6  
It is vital to pay attention to this distinction, as the likely effects of either 
behavior will be different. While behavior giving rise to primary line injury has 
exclusionary effects by harming the direct competitors of the supplier, practices 
amounting to secondary line injury lead instead to exploitative effects because the 
supplier gives preferential treatment to some customers and not to others. Although 
these exclusionary and exploitative effects of discrimination are well-known and 
documented,7 the European Commission’s decision-making practice and the EU 
Courts’ case law in the area of Article 102 TFEU have not made a clear distinction 
in legal treatment between them.8 This can be problematic since the supplier’s ability 
and incentives to discriminate will vary depending on which of the two scenarios is 
at stake, as will—even more importantly—the applicable legal and economic 
principles.9  
However, the apparent lack of a coherent legal framework to evaluate 
discriminatory practices under Article 102 TFEU does not in itself impact the 
assessment of the form of discrimination at the center of this Article, which is not 
fully captured by precedents. Personalized pricing concerns price discrimination 
against final consumers, not against customers of the dominant firm who compete 
with one another on a downstream market, as targeted by Article 102(c) TFEU. The 
fact that this form of discrimination, which is likely to become more prevalent with 
the increasing use of algorithms, does not fit with generally accepted scenarios in 
existing competition cases explains the need to examine the desirability of a 
competition intervention for this type of discrimination. 
II. THE PHENOMENON OF PERSONALIZED PRICING 
One of the most common factors that gives rise to discrimination between 
customers is price. Price discrimination occurs when the same product is sold at 
different prices to different customers even though the production costs are identical. 
It also covers situations where products are sold at the same price despite cost 
differences. A firm’s motivation to price discriminate is to extract as much as 
possible from a consumer’s maximum willingness to pay. From an economic 
                                                          
5 P. Ibanez Colomo, Exclusionary discrimination under Article 102 TFEU, COMMON MKT. L. REV., 
145 (2014). 
6 A. JONES & B. SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW. TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 381-82 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2016). 
7 See Ibanez Colomo, supra note 4, at 146 as well as the references he makes in footnote 16. 
8 In fact, as will be explained in section 3.3, Article 102(c) TFEU only expressly lists secondary line 
injury as an abuse of dominance. Nevertheless, primary line injury has also been accepted as a basis for 
competition liability under this provision in a number of cases. 
9 See DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 3, at 247 (noting “Article 102 TFEU would be clearer and 
more rational if a more explicit distinction was made” between primary and secondary line injury). 
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perspective, a distinction is made between first-, second- and third-degree price 
discrimination.10 
In first-degree or perfect price discrimination, the supplier charges each 
individual customer the maximum price it is willing to pay for the product. As it is 
mostly impossible for a supplier to know each customer’s willingness to pay, it can 
only engage in second-degree price discrimination by offering products or services 
in different packages that consumers can select based on their preferences. For 
instance, an airline typically has several types of tickets available, ranging from more 
expensive high-end tickets, including extra features that business travelers consider 
important, to relatively inexpensive low-end tickets targeted at budget travelers.11 
Finally, in third-degree price discrimination, the supplier identifies groups of 
customers by easily observable features, such as pensioners or students.12  
Although it is presently unclear to what extent first-degree price discrimination 
actually occurs,13 suppliers can now engage in personalized pricing strategies more 
easily as they are able to gather detailed information on individual consumers 
through loyalty cards or by monitoring individuals’ online behavior. While first-
degree price discrimination once required a supplier to negotiate with a customer on 
an individual basis in order to discern his or her maximum willingness to pay, the 
advent of data analytics has arguably reduced or even obviated the need for such 
individual negotiations. As such, data facilitates price discrimination and leads to the 
expectation that personalized pricing will become more prevalent in the near future.14 
Even though perfect price discrimination still largely seems a theoretical issue, there 
is a lot of concern about this practice justifying a closer look at its nature and effects.  
III. WELFARE EFFECTS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
In examining the desirability of competition enforcement, one should consider 
that price discrimination is mostly welfare-enhancing from an economic perspective 
if it increases output.15 By charging lower prices to customers that otherwise could 
not afford the product, a firm increases the number of transactions in the market, 
which is an economically rational strategy that has positive welfare effects. After all, 
customers who would have been priced out of the market now have access to the 
relevant product. Such a form of price discrimination is particularly efficient in 
industries with high fixed costs and low marginal costs. In such industries, it makes 
sense for a supplier to price products above marginal cost for customers who are 
willing to pay more. This allows the supplier to recover some fixed costs while 
charging lower marginal cost prices to other customers who can only afford the 
                                                          
10 See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (Macmillan 1920).  
11 See O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 3, at 783. 
12 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 5, at 381. 
13 See, e.g Office of Fair Trading, Personalised Pricing. Increasing Transparency to Improve Trust, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/markets-
work/personalised-pricing/oft1489.pdf and the joint report of the French CNIL and DGCCRF, IP 
Tracking : conclusions de l'enquête conjointe menée par la CNIL et la DGCCRF, (Jan. 2014) 
https://www.cnil.fr/fr/ip-tracking-conclusions-de-lenquete-conjointe-menee-par-la-cnil-et-la-dgccrf-0. 
14 EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 114 (arguing that behavioral discrimination will become 
more sustainable due to more retailers applying personalized pricing, reducing price transparency and 
increasing search costs which will make it harder for consumers to observe the competitive price and to 
evaluate their outside options). 
15 See, e.g., R. Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Third Degree Price Discrimination, 
AM. ECON. REV. 242-47 (1981); H.R. Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, AM. ECON. REV. 
870-75 (1985).  
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product at a lower price.16 However, a supplier that can price discriminate may also 
restrict output by raising prices to customers with a high willingness to pay. As a 
result, these customers will buy less than they would otherwise, thereby reducing the 
overall output of the supplier. As such, the overall effect of price discrimination on 
output and welfare is ambiguous.17  
This implies that price discrimination does not call for a general prohibition. 
Instead, its effects should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The challenge for 
competition law is to ensure that only discrimination that is harmful to consumer 
welfare is prohibited, without precluding discrimination that is welfare-enhancing. 
With the rise of personalized pricing, one must distinguish the effects of first-degree 
or perfect price discrimination from the effects of other types of price discrimination 
because first-degree price discrimination always leads to higher output. Since the 
supplier is able to identify every customer’s willingness to pay, it has no incentive to 
limit supply to any customer as long as his or her willingness to pay covers marginal 
costs. The higher output will increase overall welfare but may not necessarily result 
in greater consumer welfare. By extracting each consumer’s maximum willingness 
to pay, the supplier may appropriate the consumers’ surplus (the difference between 
the actual price charged and the consumer’s willingness to pay), leaving them worse 
off.18 Particularly if the supplier has a monopoly on the market, personalized pricing 
will lead to a transfer of gains from consumers to the supplier, who makes a greater 
profit.  
As such, when considering whether to intervene against personalized pricing, 
competition authorities also have to make a policy choice between protecting total 
welfare or consumer welfare.19 At the same time, it is important to note that 
personalized pricing may benefit consumers in oligopolies through increased 
competition. In order to poach customers from rivals, each firm will prefer to cut the 
price it offers to those consumers that it knows would otherwise not purchase the 
product. As a result, all consumers face lower prices compared to a situation where 
no price discrimination is possible.20  
The overall effect of personalized pricing on consumer surplus is thus 
ambiguous and the impact will likely vary from market to market.21 However, as 
personalized pricing reaches near perfection and the potential for consumer harm 
increases, especially in concentrated markets, competition authorities may need to 
be more wary about price discrimination.22  
IV. SCOPE FOR COMPETITION INTERVENTION 
A preliminary question when examining the desirability of competition 
enforcement for price discrimination between consumers is whether any enforcement 
                                                          
16 O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 3, at 784-85. 
17 M. MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY. THEORY AND PRACTICE 496 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
18 See O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 3, at 785-86; Autorité de la concurrence and 
Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data, 21-22 (2016). 
19 M. Maggiolino, Personalized prices in European competition law, BOCCONI LEGAL STUD. RES. 
PAPER (Jun. 13, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2984840. 
20 OECD, Price discrimination - Background note by the Secretariat, DAF/COMP(2016)15, 13 
October 2016, ¶ 38-43. 
21 When algorithms set prices: winners and losers, OXERA DISCUSSION PAPER 26 (2017). 
22 See S. Merler, Big Data and First-Degree Price Discrimination, BRUEGEL BLOG (Feb. 20 2017), 
http://bruegel.org/2017/02/big-data-and-first-degree-price-discrimination/; M. Bourreau, A. De Streel and 
I. Graef, Big Data and Competition Policy: Market Power, Personalised Pricing and Advertising, CERRE 
PROJECT REP. (Feb. 16 2017), http://cerre.eu/publications/big-data-and-competition-policy. 
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actions would be possible on the basis of current competition law standards. At the 
outset, it is important to realize that many other abusive practices, especially 
exclusionary ones like margin squeezes, predatory pricing, tying, rebates, and 
refusals to deal, contain discriminatory elements by imposing disadvantages on 
rivals. The extent to which discrimination can be abusive on its own beyond these 
specific abuses remains rather unclear.23 As the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) 
made clear in Post Danmark I, “the fact that the practice of a dominant undertaking 
may . . . be described as ‘price discrimination’ . . . cannot of itself suggest that there 
exists an exclusionary abuse.”24  
Furthermore, price discrimination between consumers would constitute a form 
of exploitative, rather than exclusionary, abuse. Because of the exploitative effects, 
discrimination between consumers shows similarities with secondary line injury. 
Article 102(c) TFEU, the main legal basis of competition liability for discrimination, 
specifically targets this behavior. This provision states that an abuse may consist in 
“applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.” The reference to “trading 
parties” and “competitive disadvantage” indicates that Article 102(c) TFEU aims to 
protect customers of the dominant firm who are in competition with each other and 
thus indeed deals with secondary line injury. Arguably, the most contentious element 
of the provision is the need for trading parties to be placed at “a competitive 
disadvantage” by the dissimilar conditions applied to them. 
The case law presents some controversy as to the interpretation of this notion. 
United Brands dealt, among other things, with price discrimination in the supply of 
bananas to ripeners and distributors from various Member States. In this case, the 
CJEU applied Article 102(c) TFEU even though the customers from different 
Member States did not compete with each other and thus were not put in a 
competitive disadvantage.25 Similarly, in Corsica Ferries, the Court relied on Article 
102(c) TFEU while the domestic and international shipping lines, which were 
charged different tariffs for piloting services, were not competing with each other.26 
Interestingly, Advocate General Van Gerven stated in his Opinion that the CJEU 
does not seem to interpret Article 102(c) TFEU restrictively. As a result, “it is not 
necessary, in order to apply it, that the trading partners of the undertaking responsible 
for the abuse should suffer a competitive disadvantage against each other or against 
the undertaking in the dominant position.”27 This statement of Advocate General Van 
Gerven and the approach of the CJEU in United Brands and Corsica Ferries 
contrasts with the later judgment in British Airways, in which the Court explicitly 
mentioned the need for a competitive disadvantage to be present under Article 102(c) 
TFEU.28  
The case dealt with bonus schemes operated by British Airways that the Court 
found resulted in discrimination between travel agents. British Airways gave 
                                                          
23 See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 5, at 559. 
24 Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet (Post Danmark I), Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, 
¶ 30. 
25 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission, Case 27/76, 
ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, ¶ 233-234. However, it seems that the reasoning of the Court of Justice was mainly 
motivated by market partitioning concerns.  
26 Corsica Ferries Italia Srl v. Corporazione dei Piloti del Porto di Genova, Case C-18/93, 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:195. In its judgment, the Court of Justice did not expand on the concept of competitive 
disadvantage at all. 
27 Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven in Case C-18/93, Corsica Ferries Italia Srl v. 
Corporazione dei Piloti del Porto di Genova, ECLI:EU:C:1994:49, ¶ 34. 
28 British Airways plc v. Commission, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166. 
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different rewards to different agents for selling the same amount of tickets. In its 
judgment, the CJEU made it clear that in order for the conditions of Article 102(c) 
TFEU to be met:  
there must be a finding not only that the behaviour of an undertaking 
in a dominant market position is discriminatory, but also that it tends 
to distort that competitive relationship, in other words to hinder the 
competitive position of some of the business partners of that 
undertaking in relation to the others.29  
The CJEU further clarified this in its preliminary ruling in Kanal 5. In this case, the 
Court expressly stated that in order to establish abuse of dominance, the national 
court must ascertain whether “Kanal 5 and TV 4, or either of those two companies, 
is a competitor of SVT on the same market.”30  
While Kanal 5 reinstated the requirement for competitive disadvantage, the 
burden of proof seems relatively low. According to the CJEU’s British Airways 
judgment, it is sufficient that discriminatory behavior of a dominant firm “tends . . . 
to lead to a distortion of competition.”31 In particular, “it cannot be required in 
addition that proof be adduced of an actual quantifiable deterioration in the 
competitive position of the business partners taken individually.”32 In Clearstream, 
the General Court repeated the Court of Justice’s statements and thereby confirmed 
the approach adopted in British Airways.33 However, the General Court also stated 
that for the purposes of the case at hand “the application to a trading partner of 
different prices for equivalent services continuously over a period of five years and 
by an undertaking having a de facto monopoly on the upstream market could not fail 
to cause that partner a competitive disadvantage.”34 This may arguably give rise to a 
presumption that price discrimination is likely to result into a competitive 
disadvantage. 
In his Opinion in MEO, Advocate General Wahl followed up on this and 
argued that even if one can derive such a presumption from this wording in 
Clearstream, the latter case is somewhat out of date.35 And indeed in its MEO 
judgment, the Court of Justice confirmed a strict, more effects-based approach and 
endorsed the Advocate-General’s approach by stating that “the mere presence of an 
immediate disadvantage affecting operators who were charged more, compared with 
the tariffs applied to their competitors for an equivalent service, does not, however, 
mean that competition is distorted or is capable of being distorted.”36 In particular, 
according to the Court, Article 102(c) TFEU covers a situation in which price 
discrimination towards downstream customers: 
is capable of distorting competition between those trade partners. A finding 
of such a ‘competitive disadvantage’ does not require proof of actual 
                                                          
29 Id., at ¶ 144. 
30 Kanal 5 Ltd and TV 4 AB v Föreningen Svenska Tonsättares Internationella Musikbyrå (STIM) 
upa, Case C-52/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:703, ¶ 46. 
31 British Airways plc v. Commission, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166, ¶ 145. 
32 Id. 
33 Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream International SA v. Commission, Case T-301/04, 
ECLI:EU:T:2009:317, ¶ 191-194. 
34 Id., at ¶ 194. 
35 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-525/16, MEO v. Serviços de Comunicações 
Multimédia SA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1020 ¶ 90. 
36 MEO v. Serviços de Comunicações Multimédia SA, Case C-525/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:270, ¶ 26. 
See also Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-525/16, MEO v. Serviços de Comunicações 
Multimédia SA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1020, ¶ 63. 
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quantifiable deterioration in the competitive situation, but must be based on 
an analysis of all the relevant circumstances of the case leading to the 
conclusion that that behaviour has an effect on the costs, profits or any other 
relevant interest of one or more of those partners, so that that conduct is such 
as to affect that situation.37  
A low standard of proof for establishing competitive advantage can be 
especially problematic where Article 102(c) TFEU is applied to situations of primary 
line injury. While the provision specifically targets secondary line injury, Article 
102(c) TFEU has also been applied in a number of cases where a dominant firm 
offered dissimilar conditions to different customers with the aim of excluding its own 
competitors on the upstream market.38 These cases have met criticism especially due 
to the relatively low standard of proof for establishing a competitive advantage as 
compared to the threshold that normally applies to exclusionary forms of abuse.39  
This quick look at the case law shows that Article 102(c) TFEU has been 
interpreted rather broadly to accommodate other forms of price discrimination that 
the Commission or EU Courts consider anticompetitive. This is an important 
observation for our purposes, as price discrimination between consumers does not fit 
the letter of Article 102(c) TFEU, either. Personalized pricing involves 
discrimination between final consumers, while the type of discrimination that Article 
102(c) TFEU targets is unequal treatment between intermediate customers.  
So far, the EU Courts have not considered whether discrimination between 
consumers can constitute abuse of dominance. The legal doctrine on Article 102 
TFEU has mainly considered discrimination against downstream customers as a 
basis for potential anticompetitive behavior.40 Interestingly, the Commission in 1999 
charged the organizers of the World Cup in France with a symbolic fine for imposing 
unfair trading conditions on consumers through the application of discriminatory 
arrangements relating to the sale of football tickets.41 However, the case dealt with 
discrimination on the basis of nationality for which the harmful effects on 
competition in the internal market are more prominent than for personalized pricing. 
Such an interpretation leaves unanswered the question of whether 
discrimination between final consumers beyond nationality falls within the ambit of 
competition law. One Commission decision explicitly dealt with this question. In 
Deutsche Post: Interception of Cross-Border Mail, the Commission stated that 
Article 102 TFEU “may be applied even in the absence of a direct effect on 
competition between undertakings on any given market” and “may be also be applied 
in situations where a dominant undertaking’s behaviour causes damage directly to 
consumers.”42 The Commission considered that the behavior of Deutsche Post 
negatively affected senders and addressees of the mailings at issue by charging them 
higher prices for postal services than other senders. While the Commission 
established that the conduct of Deutsche Post also affected the latter’s trading parties 
                                                          
37 MEO v. Serviços de Comunicações Multimédia SA, Case C-525/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:270, ¶37. 
38 See Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36; NV 
Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313; Irish 
Sugar plc v. Commission, Case T-228/97, ECLI:EU:T:1999:246. 
39 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 5, at 560. 
40 Id., at 559-66. 
41 Commission Decision of 20 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case IV/36.888 - 1998 Football World Cup) [2000] OJ L 5/55. 
42 Commission Decision of 25 July 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
(COMP/C-1/36.915 — Deutsche Post AG — Interception of cross-border mail) [2001] OJ L 331/40, ¶ 
133. 
2018] ALGORITHIMS AND FAIRNESS 549 
 
 
by putting them at a competitive disadvantage, it explicitly stated that “[e]ven in the 
absence of substantial negative effects on these trading parties, the behaviour of 
[Deutsche Post] has direct negative effects on consumers.”43 From these findings, the 
Commission concluded that “[Deutsche Post’s] behaviour thus constitutes an abuse 
of Article [102] of the [TFEU] and in particular subparagraph (c) of its second 
paragraph.”44 As such, the fact that the senders and their addressees were consumers 
of postal services did not preclude the Commission from classifying the conduct as 
an application of Article 102(c) TFEU.  
Since the case never reached the EU Courts, the question whether 
discrimination targeted at end consumers can be abusive under Article 102(c) TFEU 
on its own and in the absence of any effect on downstream customers remains 
unanswered. The Commission had in fact identified such an effect. However, this 
identification was not decisive for the Commission’s conclusion that the 
discriminatory behavior of Deutsche Post amounted to abuse of dominance. As the 
Courts have interpreted the scope of Article 102(c) TFEU broadly (covering cases 
where no competitive disadvantage was present and even involving scenarios of 
primary line injury), there is no convincing reason to exclude its applicability to price 
discrimination between consumers. Even if such behavior does not precisely fall 
within the remit of Article 102(c) TFEU, it may still be targeted as a form of 
exploitative abuse under Article 102(a) TFEU or prove illegal under the general 
abuse of dominance clause. After all, Article 102 TFEU only provides an indicative 
list of possible abuses. As the Commission stated in Deutsche Post, “the Court of 
Justice has stated that the list of abuses mentioned in Article [102] itself is not 
exhaustive and thus only serves as examples of possible ways for a dominant firm to 
abuse its market power.”45 At the same time, one cannot ignore the precise scope of 
Article 102(c) TFEU as set out in decision-making practice and case law because it 
provides the leading interpretation of the extent to which discriminatory conduct is 
anticompetitive.46 It thus remains an open question whether the Commission and EU 
Courts will accept price discrimination between end consumers as a general basis for 
an abuse of dominance claim.47 
Irrespective of current competition law standards, the normative question arises 
whether the abuse of dominance prohibition should cover discrimination between 
end consumers.48 A key issue in this regard is what competition law might add to the 
remedies that other regimes already provide to address personalized pricing. 
Furthermore, competition enforcement mainly focuses on protecting consumers 
indirectly by acting against anticompetitive exclusionary behavior, thereby keeping 
markets competitive.49 Exploitative abuses have been rather rare in the enforcement 
                                                          
43 Id. ¶ 134. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. ¶ 133. 
46 O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 3, at 777. 
47 See OECD, Price discrimination - Background note by the Secretariat, DAF/COMP(2016)15, 13 
October 2016, ¶ 72 (“In addition to a lack of case law, there has been no guidance from the Commission 
on how it investigates or prioritises non-exclusionary (exploitative or distortionary) abuses. It therefore 
remains unclear what the legal standard in Europe for exploitative price discrimination that directly harms 
final consumers is.”). 
48 See also, P. Akman, To Abuse, or not to Abuse: Discrimination between Consumers, EUR. L. REV., 
492-512. 
49 Note that the Guidance Paper only considers exclusionary abuse. Communication from the 
Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (Guidance Paper) [2009] OJ C 45/7, ¶ 
7 (“Conduct which is directly exploitative of consumers, for example charging excessively high prices or 
certain behaviour that undermines the efforts to achieve an integrated internal market, is also liable to 
550 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW [Vol. 24 
 
work of the European Commission. Consumer protection or unfair trading law are 
generally considered more apt for tackling such practices.50 The desirability of action 
against personalized pricing on the basis of competition law should therefore also 
take into account whether other legal fields such as data protection, consumer 
protection, and antidiscrimination law leave an actual enforcement gap. To that end, 
the analysis will now turn to the limits that these regimes impose on price 
discrimination. 
V. LIMITS FROM OTHER LEGAL FIELDS 
A. Limits from Data Protection Law 
In order to engage in price discrimination, firms will typically collect 
individuals’ personal data to personalize prices. In that sense, they qualify as so-
called controllers within the meaning of data protection law and, as a consequence, 
must abide by the data protection rules.51 EU data protection law aims to protect the 
fundamental right to data protection by giving data subjects control over their 
personal data and by setting limits on the collection and use of personal data.52 The 
EU legal order recognizes the right to data protection in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.53 In addition, this right is enshrined in Article 16 TFEU, which the Lisbon 
Treaty introduced as the new legal basis for the adoption of secondary data protection 
legislation. The General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”),54 which was adopted 
in April 2016 and started to apply on 25 May 2018, is based on Article 16 TFEU.  
The GDPR lays down a number of obligations for controllers and processors. 
A controller is the person or organization who determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data.55 The processor is the natural or legal person who 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller.56 In particular, Article 5(1) GDPR 
contains the data quality requirements that controllers have to meet. These 
requirements include the lawful processing of personal data, which means that the 
controller must have a legitimate ground for processing personal data, such as the 
consent of the data subject, performance of a contract, a legal obligation or the 
legitimate interests of the controller.57 In addition, the purpose limitation principle 
entails that controllers must collect personal data for specified, explicit, and 
legitimate purposes and not further process the data in a manner that is incompatible 
with those purposes.58 This implies that a firm wishing to engage in personalized 
pricing needs to have a legitimate ground for processing personal data for that 
particular purpose. Requirements other than data quality may also apply, depending 
on the circumstances and purposes of the processing.  
                                                          
infringe Article 82. The Commission may decide to intervene in relation to such conduct, in particular 
where the protection of consumers and the proper functioning of the internal market cannot otherwise be 
adequately ensured.”). 
50 See O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 3, at 846-49. 
51 Commission Regulation 2016/679, On the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [2016] OJ L119/1, art. 4(7). [hereinafter 
General Data Protection Regulation]. 
52 General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, supra note 51, art. 1. 
53 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391. 
54 General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, supra note 51. 
55 General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, supra note 51, art. 4(7). 
56 General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, supra note 51, art. 4(8). 
57 See the legitimate grounds listed in Article 6(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation 
2016/679, supra note 51. 
58 General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016, supra note 51, art. 5(1)(b). 
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Article 21(2) GDPR is relevant to personalized pricing as it gives the data 
subject the right to object to the processing of personal data for direct marketing 
purposes.59 This includes profiling,60 to the extent that it is related to such direct 
marketing. For example, a data subject may object to targeted advertising practices 
because these constitute direct marketing. A controller must stop sending targeted 
ads if the data subject objects to the processing of his or her personal data for that 
purpose.61 In addition, data subjects have a right to not be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects 
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.62 However, one 
of the situations in which this right does not apply is when the decision is based on 
the data subject’s explicit consent.63 In practice, this means that in order to engage in 
personalized pricing, which is a form of profiling, a controller must have the explicit 
consent of the data subject involved. Once the controller has obtained the consent of 
the data subject and has met the data quality requirements, it is free to engage in 
personalized pricing under data protection law.64 
B. Limits from Consumer Protection Law 
EU consumer protection law seeks to eliminate barriers to the internal market 
by assisting consumers as the weaker party in market transactions, through 
preventing or remedying market failures.65 Consumer protection is also included in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights.66 This illustrates the development of consumer 
protection from a market-oriented policy to a human right.67 
As regards limits from consumer protection law on personalized pricing, the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive excludes the adequacy of price from the assessment 
of the unfair nature of contract terms “in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible 
language.”68 As a result, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive does not call into 
question the fairness of prices in and of themselves. The Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive also leaves traders free to set prices as long as they inform 
consumers about the prices or how they are calculated.69 As a result, personalized 
pricing as such does not breach EU consumer protection law.  
                                                          
59 General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016, supra note 51, art. 21(2). 
60 Profiling in this context means: “any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of 
the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to 
analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, 
health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.” General Data 
Protection Regulation 679/2016, supra note 51, art. 4(4). 
61 General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016, supra note 51, art. 21(3). 
62 General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016, supra note 51, art. 22. 
63 General Data Protection Regulation 679/2016, supra note 51, art. 22(2)(c). 
64 For a more detailed analysis, see R. Steppe, ‘Online price discrimination and personal data: A 
General Data Protection Regulation perspective’ (2017) Computer Law & Security Review,  768-785; F. 
Zuiderveen Borgesius & J. Poort, ‘Online Price Discrimination and EU Data Privacy Law’ (2017) Journal 
of Consumer Policy,  356-363. 
65 K.J. Cseres, The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard, COMPETITION L. REV., 30. 
66 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391, art. 38 (“Union 
policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection.”). 
67 See I. Benöhr, EU Consumer Law and Human Rights (Oxford Studies in European Law 2013), 
45-68. 
68  Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC, on the use of surprising or onerous terms used by 
businesses in deals with consumers [1993] OJ L 95/29, art. 4(2). 
69 In line with European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/29/EC  ,on unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the internal market (hereinafter Unfair Commercial Practices Directive) 
[2005] OJ L 149/22, art. 6(1)(d) and art. 7(4)(c). 
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Nevertheless, in its 2016 Guidance on the implementation and application of 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the European Commission did clarify 
that a breach of that Directive may occur when personalized pricing is combined with 
certain commercial practices.70 An example is the use of information gathered 
through profiling in order to exert undue influence. According to the Commission, a 
trader who falsely claims that only a few tickets are left after finding out that a 
consumer is running out of time to buy a flight ticket may be considered to have 
engaged in a misleading commercial practice prohibited by Article 6(1).71 This 
provision regards a commercial practice as misleading if it contains false information 
or deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer and causes, or is likely to 
cause a consumer to make a transactional decision that he or she would not otherwise 
have taken. This is true even if the information is factually correct. Under point no. 
7 of Annex I of the Directive, one per se unfair commercial practice is a false 
statement “that a product will only be available for a very limited time, or that it will 
only be available on particular terms for a very limited time, in order to elicit an 
immediate decision and deprive consumers of sufficient opportunity or time to make 
an informed choice.”72 In addition, as made clear by the Commission, Articles 8 and 
9 of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive require marketing based on tracking 
and profiling not to involve aggressive commercial practices.73 In this regard, point 
no. 26 of Annex I prohibits making persistent and unwanted commercial 
communications to consumers.74  
Personalized pricing as such is thus not problematic from a consumer 
protection law perspective. As long as suppliers do not engage in any misleading or 
aggressive commercial practices, they are free to customize prices provided they are 
transparent with consumers about doing so. However, any misleading commercial 
practices would violate the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in and of 
themselves, even when not combined with personalized pricing. Thus, it is not the 
pricing that would violate the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, but the 
commercial practices surrounding it. 
C. Limits from Antidiscrimination Law 
Apart from national antidiscrimination laws prohibiting differentiation based 
on factors such as gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion, and age, there is no general 
prohibition on price discrimination under civil law rules. When it comes to EU 
legislation, Article 20 of the Services Directive prohibits discrimination based on the 
service recipient’s nationality or residence in line with the Treaty rules on the free 
movement of services.75 However, this does not preclude a firm from offering 
different prices or conditions when providing a service, if those differences are 
justified by objective reasons. These reasons vary from country to country and may 
include diverse rationales, such as “additional costs incurred because of the distance 
                                                          
70 Commission Staff Working Document – Guidance on the Implementation/Application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices, 25 May 2016, SWD(2016) 163 final, 149. 
71 Commission Staff Working Document – Guidance on the Implementation/Application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices, 25 May 2016, SWD(2016) 163 final, 146. 
72 Point no. 7 of Annex I (‘Commercial practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair’) 
attached to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
73 Commission Staff Working Document – Guidance on the Implementation/Application of 
Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices, 25 May 2016, SWD(2016) 163 final, 149. 
74 Point no. 26 of Annex I attached to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
75 European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/123/EC, on services in the internal market 
(hereinafter Services Directive) [2006] OJ L 376/36. 
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involved or the technical characteristics of the provision of the service, or different 
market conditions.”76  
On the basis of Article 20 of the Services Directive, the Commission started 
an investigation against Disneyland Paris in summer 2015. The Commission acted 
on the basis of allegations that the firm only made cheap deals available for residents 
of France or Belgium, in violation of the Services Directive. In April 2016, 
Disneyland Paris changed its policy and brought its online booking procedures and 
payment methods for tickets in line with the principle of non-discrimination.77 
The Regulation on geo-blocking, adopted on 28 February 2018, is also 
notable.78 Geo-blocking occurs when traders operating in one Member State block 
or limit access to their websites or apps by customers from other Member States 
wishing to enter into cross-border commercial transactions.79 Discrimination also 
occurs when traders apply different general conditions of access to their goods and 
services with respect to customers from other Member States, both online and 
offline.80 In particular, the Regulation aims to prevent discrimination based on the 
nationality, place of residence or place of establishment of customers.81 This goes 
beyond Article 20 of the Services Directive, which was found to insufficiently 
address discrimination against customers.82 However, the Regulation does not 
harmonize prices; rather, it addresses discrimination in access to goods and services 
that cannot be objectively justified.83 
In cases where geo-blocking involves vertical restrictions of competition, there 
is also scope for competition enforcement under Article 101 TFEU, as evidenced by 
the proceedings of the Commission against Disney, NBCUniversal, Sony, Twentieth 
Century Fox, Warner Bros, Paramount and Sky UK in the area of cross-border 
provision of pay TV services.84 In addition, the Commission announced competition 
investigations in the video game and hotel booking sectors in February 2017.85  With 
regard to video games, the investigation focuses on whether agreements concluded 
between Valve, the owner of a game distribution platform, and five personal 
computer video game publishers required the use of activation keys by consumers 
for the purposes of geo-blocking. In particular, the use of activation keys that grant 
access to a purchased game only to consumers in a particular Member State may 
amount to a breach of Article 101 TFEU by reducing cross-border competition. 
                                                          
76 Recital 95 of the Services Directive. 
77 Disneyland Paris, EU Commission https://ec.europa.eu/germany/news/disneyland-paris-
kommission-begr%C3%BC%C3%9Ft-%C3%A4nderung-der-preispolitik_de. (last visited Sep. 26, 
2018). 
78 European Parliament and Council Regulation 302/2018, on addressing unjustified geo-blocking 
and other forms of discrimination based on customers' nationality, place of residence or place of 
establishment within the internal market and amending Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 
2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2018 OJ LI 60/1. [hereinafter Regulation on geo-blocking] 
79 Regulation on geo-blocking rec. 1. 
80 Id. 
81 Regulation on geo-blocking rec. 5. 
82 See id., rec. 4. 
83 See id., rec. 27  
84 See Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections 
on Cross-border Provision of Pay-TV Services Available in UK and Ireland (Jul. 23, 2015) (on file with 
Commission Press Release Database); see Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission 
Accepts Commitments by Paramount on Cross-border Pay-TV Services (Jul. 26, 2016) (on file with 
Commission Press Release Database).  
85 See Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Opens Three Investigations Into 
Suspected Anticompetitive Practices in e-commerce (Feb. 2, 2017) (on file with Commission Press 
Release Database).  
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Parallel trade may be restricted within the single market, preventing consumers from 
buying cheaper games available in other Member States. Similarly, the Commission 
has taken issue with agreements regarding hotel accommodations concluded between 
European tour operators and hotels. The Commission is concerned that these 
agreements may contain clauses that discriminate between customers on the basis of 
their nationality or country of residence. Due to these contractual clauses, customers 
would not be able to see a hotel’s full availability or book hotel rooms at the best 
prices. This may breach Article 101 TFEU and lead to the partitioning of the single 
market by preventing consumers from booking hotel accommodation under better 
conditions offered by tour operators in other Member States.86 In the context of 
Article 102 TFEU, however, it remains unclear to what extent a dominant 
undertaking can be held liable for differentiating or personalizing prices among 
consumers.  
VI. SOME THOUGHTS REGARDING APPROPRIATE REMEDIES 
AGAINST PERSONALIZED PRICING 
The role of data protection and consumer protection law in targeting price 
discrimination mainly relates to the need for transparency and the provision of 
adequate information to users. These regimes do not ban price discrimination as long 
as no misleading or aggressive practices occur under the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive and as long as data subjects have given their consent for 
controllers to engage in personalized pricing under EU data protection law. While 
data subjects can thus reduce the likelihood of price discrimination by denying 
consent to controllers for engaging in automated individual decision-making, 
controllers may rely on other legitimate grounds for processing personal data.  
Article 22(2) GDPR places limitations on the right of the data subject not to be 
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing. Article 22(2) states that 
the right does not apply if the decision: (1) is necessary for entering into, or 
performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller; (2) is 
authorized by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and 
which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and 
freedoms and legitimate interests; and (3) is based on the data subject's explicit 
consent.87 Notably, Article 15 of the Data Protection Directive, the predecessor of 
the GDPR, did not provide for consent as an exception ground for the controller to 
engage in automated decision-making.88 In principle, automated decision-making 
was prohibited under the Data Protection Directive unless authorized by Union or 
Member State law to which the controller was subject.89 As such, the GDPR provides 
controllers with more opportunities to apply personalized prices. As to the role of 
consent in legitimizing automated decision-making, one may doubt the capability of 
the data subject to identify the risks involved. Even if the controller fulfils all the 
information requirements under the GDPR, it is questionable whether the data 
subject realizes how an automated decision question may truly affect and impact him.  
On this basis, it is submitted that there is scope for other regimes to restrict price 
discrimination even in the presence of information requirements imposed by data 
                                                          
86 See id.  
87 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra 46, art. 22(2). 
88 See European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, On the Protection of Individuals With 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data [1995] OJ L 281/31, 
art. 14. 
89 See id. art. 15. 
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protection and consumer protection law. Findings from behavioral economics 
indicate that even when consumers are offered adequate information, they might not 
act rationally, because they may have limited willpower or be affected by biases and 
heuristics.90 Requirements of transparency and information provision may thus have 
a limited effect. While national antidiscrimination legislation may ban discriminatory 
conduct, its scope is typically limited to instances where differentiation is based on 
factors such as gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion, and age. In turn, EU internal 
market law is only useful in situations where discrimination takes place on the basis 
of nationality, place of residence, or place of establishment.91 As such, competition 
enforcement arguably constitutes a welcome addition to the remedies available under 
other legal regimes. This is especially true considering that competition law may ban 
price discrimination on a case-by-case basis even if consumers are sufficiently 
informed that such practices take place.  
An alternative approach would be to pose more general limits on the 
personalization of prices. A way to address this issue would be to mark personalized 
pricing as an unfair practice, similar to the practices currently included on the so-
called black list annexed to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.92 The 
commercial practices included on this list are considered unfair in all circumstances. 
Nevertheless, as the welfare effects of price discrimination are ambiguous and 
studies about the effects of personalized prices more specifically have so far led to 
different conclusions,93 it would not be optimal from an economic perspective to ban 
the practice of personalized pricing altogether. With its case-by-case approach 
enabling an analysis of the effects in individual circumstances, the abuse of 
dominance regime of competition law seems more suitable to address instances 
where personalized pricing harms consumers. 
As to the required approach to target price discrimination, the first line of 
defense should be data protection and consumer protection law. Data and consumer 
protection authorities should ensure compliance with information requirements so 
that individuals become aware of personalized pricing. More awareness among the 
general public may lead firms to be more hesitant to engage in further price 
discrimination out of fear of reputational backlash. Since antidiscrimination law is 
only applicable to specific forms of discrimination, it becomes a policy question as 
to whether competition law should be used as an additional instrument to target price 
discrimination between consumers by dominant firms. The main challenge here 
would be to distinguish harmful forms of personalized pricing from those that are 
welfare-enhancing under Article 102 TFEU.94 As price discrimination is more likely 
to negatively impact consumers in monopolistic markets,95 it makes sense to limit 
enforcement actions to discriminatory behavior of dominant companies that are 
targeted by the abuse of dominance regime of Article 102 TFEU. 
                                                          
90 See generally, DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (Penguin 2011). 
91 See European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/123/EC, On Services in the Internal Market 
[2006] OJ L 376/36, art. 20. 
92 See European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/29/EC, Concerning Unfair Business-to-
Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market [2005] OJ L 149/22 , Annex I (“Commercial 
practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair.”). 
93 For an overview of recent research, see Siliva Merler, Big Data and First-degree Price 
Discrimination, BRUEGEL (Sept. 15, 2018, 6:16 pm), 20 February 2017, http://perma.cc/QYM6-PJKS.  
94 For a proposed framework, see OECD, Price discrimination - Background note by the Secretariat, 
DAF/COMP(2016)15, 13 October 2016, ¶ 73-81. 
95 See § 3.2 above. 
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While competition interventions typically focus on addressing the exclusionary 
conduct of dominant firms,96 there are signs that exploitative abuses are moving up 
the agenda of competition authorities. In November 2016, Competition 
Commissioner Vestager stated explicitly that there can be times where a competition 
intervention is necessary when “competition hasn’t been enough to provide a real 
choice” and “dominant businesses are exploiting their customers, by charging 
excessive prices or imposing unfair terms.”97 It is worth noting that in May 2017, the 
Commission opened its first investigation into concerns about excessive pricing 
practices in the pharmaceutical industry against the company Aspen Pharma.98 At 
the national level, the Bundeskartellamt (the German competition authority) opened 
proceedings against Facebook in March 2016 to examine whether consumers are 
sufficiently informed about the type and extent of personal data collected on its social 
network.99 The Bundeskartellamt preliminarily concluded in December 2017 that 
Facebook’s terms of service violated data protection law and thereby also constituted 
abuse of dominance under competition law as an abusive imposition of unfair 
conditions on users.100 The investigation seems to proceed on the view that principles 
from data protection law can provide benchmarks for assessing whether certain 
exploitative behavior of a dominant firm should be considered anticompetitive under 
Article 102 TFEU.101 It seems that the benchmark relied upon by the 
Bundeskartellamt is the validity of consent under data protection law. More 
specifically, the Bundeskartellamt seems to consider whether the consent given by 
Facebook users is sufficiently informed, as required by Article 4(11) GDPR. 
Depending on how the investigation evolves, the Bundeskartellamt may set a new 
precedent under which competition enforcement also has a role to play in preventing 
the exploitation of consumers by dominant firms through the imposition of unfair 
conditions regarding the processing of personal data.  
It remains to be seen whether these developments will lead to an increase in the 
attention accorded by competition authorities to exploitative abuses more generally. 
Such a development would enhance the scope of competition enforcement to include 
types of price discrimination that exploit consumers but do not have an exclusionary 
effect, like personalized pricing. As competition law is inherently more apt to target 
exclusionary behavior, there should be limits on the extent to which exploitation can 
form the basis for a competition intervention. In the words of Competition 
Commissioner Vestager, “sometimes, a company is dominant simply because it’s 
better than its competitors. And when that’s the case, it’s only fair that it should get 
the reward of its efforts.”102 There is a need to prevent “competition authorities taking 
                                                          
96 See Commission Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, at 7, COM (2003)  45 final 
(Feb. 24, 2009) . 
97 See Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner for Competition, European Commission, Address at the 
Chillin’ Competition Conference:  Protecting Consumers From Exploitation (Nov. 21, 2016) [hereinafter 
Address Protecting Consumers]. 
98 See Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Investigation 
into Aspen Pharma’s Pricing Practices for Cancer Medicines (May 15, 2017) (on file with Commission 
Press Release Database).  
99 See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Initiates Proceeding Against Facebook on 
Suspicion of Having Abused its Market Power by Infringing Data Protection Rules (March 2, 2016) (on 
file with Bundeskartellamt Press Release Database).   
100 See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Preliminary Assessment in Facebook Proceeding: 
Facebook's Collection and Use of Data From Third-party Sources is Abusive (Dec. 19, 2017) (on file with 
Bundeskartellamt Press Release Database).  
101 See also Francisco Costa-Cabral and Orla Lynskey, Family Ties: The Intersection Between Data 
Protection and Competition in EU Law, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 11, 33-37 (2017).  
102 Margrethe Vestager, supra note 97, Address Protecting Consumers.   
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the place of the market” as a regulator, “deciding on the right price” in the context of 
possible competition interventions against excessive pricing. As such, “[t]he best 
defence against exploitation remains the ability to walk away” and consumers can 
often be protected “just by stopping powerful companies from driving their rivals out 
of the market.”103 Nevertheless, when competition fails to enable consumers to vote 
with their feet, competition authorities should have the option to take direct action 
against exploitation in order to adequately protect consumer interests. As suggested 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), one 
relevant factor in examining the desirability of a competition intervention to address 
personalized pricing could be the extent to which the exploitation is sustainable.104 
For instance, the exploitation may be of a transitory character that the market could 
be expected to resolve itself if the price-discriminating firm is not protected by 
barriers to entry.105 In this regard, competition authorities may request information 
from buyers and sellers on how long the scheme has already been in place in order 
to understand whether the exploitation is likely to persist.106 
Apart from such limiting principles, the possibility of a competition 
intervention for anticompetitive forms of personalized pricing that exploit 
consumers, and thereby harm consumer welfare, does not seem unreasonable. In fact, 
the rise of the notion of “fairness” in competition policy circles as an underlying 
principle of competition enforcement may point to a stronger willingness of 
competition authorities to address exploitative practices.107 Such references to 
fairness cannot expand the reach of the competition rules. However, an explicit 
recognition of fairness as an inherent objective or outcome of competition 
enforcement does emphasize that competition law is about protecting the competitive 
process to the benefit of consumers, competitors, and the economy as a whole, 
thereby contributing to a fairer society.108 As such, competition interventions should 
not be limited to instances of exclusionary abuse but should also target exploitative 
behavior that leads to “unfair” outcomes directly harming consumers.  
Irrespective of whether it triggers competition concerns, price discrimination is 
largely regarded as “unfair.” Even if consumers will benefit from lower prices in 
some instances, they may feel uncomfortable about companies varying prices 
according to individuals’ willingness to pay. Consumers generally will not oppose 
price discrimination that advances social goals, such as facilitating access for lower-
income consumers. Nor will consumers generally oppose price discrimination that 
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increases the overall quality of the product, for instance by increasing diversity 
through subsidizing tuition fees for certain students in prestigious study programs. 
However, price discrimination that has profit maximization as its sole goal and 
simply sorts consumers in order to extract as much surplus from them as possible is 
unlikely to prove socially acceptable.109 When the existence of different cost levels 
cannot explain differentiated pricing, consumers will not likely accept such 
discriminatory practices.110 Apart from this consumer perception of personalized 
pricing as a breach of equality, the alleged “unfairness” of such practices also has a 
competition angle. By exercising their market power, dominant firms can take 
advantage of consumers who do not have any other viable outside option. Dominant 
firms can then extract consumers’ maximum willingness to pay or make consumers 
buy products that they may not need or want. Such conduct may not only be unfair 
from the perspective of individual consumers that are targeted by the exploitative 
practices, but can also harm the economy as a whole.111 If a market player engages 
in personalized pricing, and in particular if it does so in a non-transparent way, this 
may impact the confidence of consumers in markets in general and lead consumers 
to become more hesitant to make purchases.112  
While more evidence is necessary to understand the impact of personalized 
pricing facilitated by algorithms, competition enforcement should not be ruled out 
from the outset. It may prove a suitable instrument to address the harmful effects of 
such conduct. These possible harmful effects go beyond what data and consumer 
protection can currently address by ensuring that individuals remain in control of 
their personal identity and are aware of how prices are set.113 As such, in order to 
ensure an adequate level of protection against exploitation that harms consumer 
welfare, a need exists to further examine the scope for competition enforcement to 
address personalized pricing by dominant firms. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Personalized pricing towards end consumers does not entirely fit the scenarios 
of discrimination generally accepted in decision-making practice and case law under 
Article 102 TFEU. The rise of algorithms that further facilitate discriminatory 
practices increases the need to clarify the potential of competition enforcement in 
addressing price discrimination. While Article 102 TFEU is sufficiently flexible to 
capture these—so far— rarer forms of discrimination, it is a policy question whether 
and to what extent competition enforcement should apply to personalized pricing.  
When answering this question, one should not only consider the welfare effects 
of discriminatory behavior more thoroughly but also examine what competition law 
                                                          
109 Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice.E. Stucke, 122-23 VIRTUAL COMPETITION. THE PROMISE AND PERILS 
OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN Economy (2016). 
110 See When Algorithms Set Prices: Winners and Losers, 27, Oxera, 2017.   
111 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 109, 105, 123-24.  
112 Marc Bourreau et al, Big Data and Competition Policy: Market Power, Personalised Pricing and 
Advertising: CERRE Project Report, CERRE (Sept. 17, 2018, 12:06 PM), https://perma.cc/K7D4-WRPF.   
113 But see, Mariateresa Maggiolino, Personalized Prices in European Competition Law, Bocconi 
Legal Studies Research Paper (Sept. 17, 2018, 12:33 PM), https://perma.cc/CPB8-V6UA (“The main legal 
issues that seem to arise from personalized prices derived from big data concern the circulation and use 
of the information. Namely, the extent of information offered to buyers, digital or not, so that any 
purchases based on customized prices do not occur with their ignorance or lack of awareness as to the 
information upon which the price has been formulated. In addition, there is the issue of what rules are 
necessary to ensure individuals remain in control of their digital identity and the way in which it is used.”). 
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can add to the remedies that are available under other regimes. As it relies on a case-
by-case analysis, competition enforcement may prove a suitable way to address the 
harmful effects of price discrimination towards end consumers that currently cannot 
be tackled on the basis of other regimes. As such, lessons should be drawn from the 
way in which competition law and other regimes interact in targeting personalized 
pricing. 
 
